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A “Silk Road” for Capital: Trade Policy 
and Foreign Investment Laws of 
China’s Neighbors 
Zachary Strom 
Abstract: This article presents a comparative study of the foreign investment laws and 
treaties of two of China's neighbors, Pakistan and Mongolia. As China moves forward 
in implementing a "One Belt, One Road" policy of major investments in trans-national 
infrastructure projects, leaders of neighboring countries including the two discussed 
here have demonstrated eagerness for its plans. The laws governing foreign trade and 
investment in each jurisdiction may be crucial to the success of Chinese investment ef-
forts. The article discusses the evolution of both Pakistan's and Mongolia's laws and 
policies–Pakistan, as an enthusiastic partner and linchpin in China's "Belt," and 
Mongolia, as a resource economy that has, at times, struggled to draw the line on 
overwhelming Chinese influence. When examined, the laws and treaties of each nation 
show both reflections of and reactions to China's grand ambitions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The collaborative atmosphere of “globalization” in the 1990s, signified 
by the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the concomi-
tant explosion of multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), seems to have 
come to an end with the breakdown of Doha Round talks earlier in this dec-
ade.1 Since the breakdown of these talks, collaboration has turned to com-
petition as major economic powers each negotiate separate, competing 
agreements to create trade cartels that might influence future multilateral 
trade negotiations. In the United States, this approach was evident in the 
negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Pacific Rim nations 
(notably, not China) and talks with the European Union to create a Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Pact (TTIP).2 Were these treaties to come into 
effect, their potential would be to create a massive international trade net-
work, anchored in U.S. markets, with the ability to influence the future of 
globalization. Yet the new U.S. President’s denunciation of these deals as 
“horrible” and his apparent preference for protectionism may spell the end 
of American hegemony on trade policy.3 This, in turn, allows other large 
state actors, chiefly China, to utilize their own influence and craft a distinct 
approach to building trade networks.4 The purpose of this note is to analyze 
China’s approach to international trade and investment deals, using its trade 
relationships with two of its neighbors as a case study, in the hopes that 
such analysis will provide a useful lens with which to look at future efforts 
in this arena. This will be followed by a look at the pushback that can occur 
when Chinese efforts are viewed as a naked grab at power, as has been the 
case in western China and in Mongolia. In this instance, it is important to 
note that Mongolia has grappled with the need to create a foreign invest-
ment policy of which the Chinese cannot take advantage. 
The current course of events leaves ample room for China, and not the 
U.S., to become the dominant trading power in Asia and set a new tone for 
the next stage of global trade talks. Yet China’s grand vision of investment 
in massive infrastructure upgrades across Eurasia through the “Silk Road 
Economic Belt,” just half of an enormous “One Belt, One Road” foreign 
investment strategy to link European, Asian and African resources and 
                                                          
 1 David Kleimann & Joe Guinan, THE DOHA ROUND: AN OBITUARY (Global Governance 
Programme, 2011). 
 2  Randi Brown, TPP? TTIP? Key Trade Deal Terms Explained, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 
(May 20, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2015/05/20/tpp-ttip-key-
trade-deal-terms-explained/. 
 3  Vicki Needham, Trump Vows to Overhaul ‘Horrible’ Trade Deals, THE HILL (July 21, 
2016), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/288812-trump-vow-to-overhaul-us-trade-policy. 
 4  Brooke Wylie, Donald Trump: China Exploiting US Isolationist Agenda to Gain Pow-
er in Asia, Experts Say, ABC NEWS (June 10, 2017); see also Jethro Mullen & Charles Riley, 
China and Europe are Moving Forward Without Trump, CNN MONEY (June 1, 2017), mon-
ey.cnn.com/2017/05/31/news/economy/china-europe-eu-trump-us-trade/index.html. 
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markets and formalized at a 2017 summit, will involve negotiating across a 
highly varied foreign investment landscape and implicate a host of compet-
ing international interests.5 6  
It is thus sensible that China would place the highest priority on a trade 
route that only requires dealing with one country, long a friendly one, that 
could connect China to the Indian Ocean. That nation is Pakistan, and much 
has been written on the heralded CPEC, the beautiful melody in the “sym-
phony” of the Silk Road plan.7 One other reason is that Pakistan’s invest-
ment rules and treaties with China make the country much more attractive 
and secure a place to invest than many of China’s neighbors that have only 
recently transitioned to market economies. 
One such neighbor is Mongolia, which, despite a long historical asso-
ciation with China (interrupted only by 20th century Soviet domination), 
has not embraced Chinese investment quite so readily.8 It has instead pur-
sued a diversified portfolio of foreign investors through a “third neighbor” 
policy, which itself has been undercut by the government’s lashing out 
against investors perceived to be under Chinese influence.9 Having endured 
a steep recession owed in large part to the subsequent dearth of foreign in-
vestment, Mongolia is now another target of Chinese economic expansion-
ism through the proposed China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, yet 
its legal infrastructure is far less prepared than Pakistan’s for such a plan.10  
The aim of this paper is to survey Pakistan and Mongolia’s differing 
positions in this network and look at the broader legal and economic forces 
driving these differences. Hopefully, this will serve to illustrate the variety 
of regulatory regimes China must confront if it is to realize its “Silk Road” 
vision.  
 
                                                          
 5  The other half of OBOR is a “Maritime Silk Road,” a series of port upgrades that will 
facilitate increased shipping to southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Tian Jinchen, 
One Belt and One Road: Connecting China and the World, MCKINSEY (July 2016), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/one-
belt-and-one-road-connecting-china-and-the-world. 
 6  AP, Chinese President Xi Hosts Belt and Road Forum, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 
(May 15, 2017), https://www.scmp.com/video/china/2094362/chinese-president-xi-hosts-
belt-and-road-forum. 
 7  Ahmad Gouri, Towards Greater Integration? Legal and Policy Directions of Chinese 
Investments in Pakistan on the Advent of the Silk Road Economic Belt, 4 CHIN J COMP LAW 
36, 45 (2016). 
 8  Gregor Grossman, One Belt, One Road and the Sino-Mongolian Relationship, 
ASIENHAUS (April 9, 2017), https://www.asienhaus.de/uploads/tx_news/2017_April-
9_Mongolei UA_sec_01.pdf. 
 9  Country Profiles: Mongolia, OEC, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/mng/. 
 10  Reuters, China, Russia, Mongolia Sign Economic Corridor Plan, XINHUA (June 24, 
2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1980597/china-russia-
mongolia-sign-economic-corridor-plan. 
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II. CHINESE TRADE POLICY 
China’s emergence onto the stage of international trade was a relative-
ly recent occurrence. Only after the death of doctrinaire Communist leader 
Mao Zedong did more liberal voices in the nation’s government, led by 
Deng Xiaoping, authorize limited capitalist development and other re-
forms.11 The handovers of Hong Kong and Macau in 1997 and 1999, re-
spectively, gave China a substantial degree of control over two major de-
veloped market economies as its “Special Administrative Regions.” China 
concluded its first FTAs with these two entities in 2003. Soon after it pur-
sued free trade with several other substantial developing (and, since 2008, 
developed) market economies.12 One such economy is Pakistan, which con-
cluded a free trade agreement with China in 2003 and has since made sev-
eral bilateral amendments to strengthen the countries’ trade relationship.13 
This culminated in the announcement of the China-Pakistan Economic Cor-
ridor (CPEC) plan, the discussion of which is a central feature of this note.  
According to Michael Clarke, a litany of international and domestic 
considerations have driven the efforts of China to build influence in central 
Asia, and development is but one of these.14 The region is open for Chinese 
influence, he says, due to a diminishing U.S. presence in Afghanistan and 
the U.S.’s concomitant abandonment of regional development efforts.15 
Meanwhile, China has also benefited from the weakness of the region’s 
other major power, Russia. Russia’s leadership had pushed the notion of a 
“Eurasian Economic Union” to facilitate trade between its eastern European 
and Central Asian spheres of influence, and before 2014 this showed signs 
of life. That year, the Ukrainian people overthrew the country’s Russian-
aligned government, to which President Putin responded with a thinly dis-
guised invasion of the Crimea and eastern Ukraine.16 The resulting econom-
ic sanctions to punish Russia have damaged Russia’s economy, leading to 
economic collapse in the other would-be EAEU states.17  
 
                                                          
 11  Deng Xiaoping, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/ 
Deng-Xiaoping (last visited February 4, 2017). 
 12  China FTA Network, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
english/. 
 13  Guiguo Wang, Current Developments: China’s FTAs: Legal Characteristics and Im-
plications, 105 A.J.I.L. 493, 498 (2011). 
 14  Michael Clarke, Beijing’s March West: Opportunities and Challenges for China’s 
Eurasian Pivot, Orbis 60 FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST., no. 2 Orbis, 2016, 296. 
 15  Id. at 300. 
 16  Casey Michel, Even Vladimir Putin’s Authoritarian Allies Are Fed Up with Russia’s 
Crumbling Economy, THE NEW REPUBLIC (January 18, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/ 
article/120778/eurasian-economic-union-putins-geopolitical-project-already-failing. 
 17  Clarke, supra note 18, at 302. 
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This has made central and western Asia especially attractive to China, 
whose SREB plan envisions trade and investment in infrastructure and re-
source development along an east-west axis through western China and 
across Eurasia. Adhering to the convention that Chinese foreign policy is an 
extension of domestic policy priorities, the Chinese plan is in part a reaction 
to Beijing’s own vulnerability in its western province of Xinjiang, which 
has been plagued by ethnic strife since 2008.18 The SREB plan can be read 
as an attempt to boost the economy of Xinjiang and make it a hub of trade 
economically dependent on China.19 This is evidenced in the CPEC plan, 
which relies on the Xinjiang city of Kashgar as such a hub.20 However, it 
would be naïve to say that China seeks to incorporate Xinjiang for solely 
economic reasons. Over time, China’s efforts in that province and Tibet 
have reached beyond the economic and into much-resented attempts at cul-
tural influence.21 An important consideration is that the SREB could back-
fire on this objective due to the greater connection to countries affected by 
terrorism (including Pakistan), as well as the possibility that regional na-
tions will balance China’s economic influence by making strategic political 
networks with other powers.22  
According to Guiguo Wang’s analysis of China’s FTAs, there is a 
trend of growth in China’s use of bilateral FTAs to fill the void in interna-
tional trade cooperation left by the breakdown of Doha Round talks.23 
Wang traces the development of Chinese FTAs, from its agreements with 
its own “Special Administrative Regions” of Hong Kong and Macau in 
2003 (the same year Pakistan and China concluded their first “Preferential 
Trade Agreement.”)24 A rule through which Wang analyzes China’s FTA 
development and foreign policy generally is that it is an extension of the 
state’s domestic policy, and trade with Pakistan became important to con-
nect the restive province of Xinjiang to China’s economy and the outside 
world.25 
Pakistan was one of first countries to get a bilateral trade agreement 
                                                          
 18  Usaid Siddiqui, The Ethnic Roots of China’s Uighur Crisis, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Ju-
ly 21, 2015) http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/7/the-ethnic-roots-of-chinas-uighur-
crisis.html. 
 19  Clarke, supra note 18, at 307. 
 20  Christine R. Guluzian, Making Inroads: China’s New Silk Road Initiative, 37 CATO J. 
135, 143 (2017); see also Su-Mei Ooi and Kate Trinkle, China’s New Silk Road and its Im-
pact on Xinjiang, THE DIPLOMAT (March 5, 2015), thediplomat.com/2015/03/chinas-new-
silk-road-and-its-impact-on-xinjiang. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. at 305. 
 23  Wang, supra note 17, at 500. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Clarke, supra note 18, at 298. 
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with China, and in 2008 China and Pakistan amended their FTA, a combi-
nation of five smaller agreements, to promote bilateral investment.26 Wang 
traces four stages in the evolution of trade relations: first, the 2003 agree-
ment for preferential tariffs towards each other’s exports, followed by an 
“Early Harvest” program providing for more tariff elimination.27 This led 
the way to the 2008 amendments and a 2009 agreement on trade and ser-
vices, making the China-Pakistan FTA the most thorough Chinese bilateral 
FTA as of Wang’s publication.28 
China’s pattern of FTA negotiation involves tailoring each agreement 
individually, and there is no template used (though all of its FTAs require 
the signatories to recognize each other’s “market economy” status.)29 Alt-
hough China carries substantial economic leverage into each FTA negotia-
tion, it has had to make concessions of its own to maintain trade relations 
with its desired partners, including curtailing the use of agricultural subsi-
dies.30 Whether the rise of the SREB will allow more direct Chinese influ-
ence over other countries is an open question. 
China also does not opt for rigid dispute settlement provisions, instead 
relying on conflict avoidance through negotiation.31 However, more recent-
ly, China has made a pivot to accepting investor-state dispute settlement 
through arbitration, qualified by a statute of limitations, administrative re-
view, and the supremacy of treaty law over domestic regulations.32 
Guiguo Wang notes the priorities of China in concluding FTAs are ge-
opolitics, resource supply, and domestic economic needs.33 He also identi-
fies some unique problems that China faces, influencing its approach.34 
Wang provides a survey of China’s agreements as examples for each of his 
claims. The China-Pakistan agreement, he says, fulfills FTAs’ “primary 
purpose” of economic development, the elimination of trade barriers, and 
succeeds in promoting bilateral trade, making it a relatively adequate stand-
ard by which to judge other Chinese FTAs. 35 
China’s trade policy also involves long-term strategic objectives, par-
ticularly in regard to winnowing inefficient sectors of the economy and se-
curing an energy supply, which is a critical aspect of the CPEC agreement 
as China consumes a considerable quantity of oil and nonrenewable fuels.36 
                                                          
 26  Wang, supra note 17, at 512. 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id.at 502. Agriculture is a primary industry of both Pakistan and Mongolia. 
 31  Wang, supra note 17, at 502. 
 32  Id. at 510. 
 33  Id. at 504. 
 34  Id. at 515. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Josephine Mason, China’s CNPC Forecasts Record Oil Demand, Warns on Product 
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China has also aggressively pursued trade with the oil-rich Central Asian 
bloc of the former U.S.S.R. through the same mechanism of offering pref-
erential trade treatment in exchange for direct foreign investment.37 
Geopolitical considerations also influence the patterns of Chinese trade 
efforts. While, according to Wang, China’s economy is not the dominant 
force in East Asia due to the influence of the U.S. and Tiger economies 
(Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea), FTAs expand its influ-
ence while at the same time giving nations that distrust China a reason not 
to.38  
China faces additional challenges in reforming the international free 
trade regime. In the Sino-Pakistani trade relationship, limited bad faith con-
tinues as Pakistan continues to illegally avoid Chinese tariffs.39 China, for 
its part, quietly inserted a provision into the FTA requiring Pakistan to give 
preferential treatment to goods for Hong Kong, even though that state was 
not party to the agreement.40 Examples like these give some credence to the 
international view of China as a somewhat cunning and manipulative trade 
power.41  
Wang predicts China will continue to use FTAs to influence the rules 
of world trade and pursue its strategic interests, perhaps against the will of 
“first world” nations.42 China has been inhibited in its pursuit of FTAs with 
several countries due to their distrust of Chinese motives, although the sud-
den reversals in U.S. trade policy spurred by the inauguration of President 
Donald J. Trump may change this dynamic.43 
The Chinese trade policy, as stated above, may get a boost from the 
apparent fall of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 
The critically endangered trade agreement would have involved Aus-
tralia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, and Vietnam in significantly enhanced trade with the U.S. Yet 
the agreement would require ratification by both the U.S. and Japan to go 
into effect, and the Trump administration’s official withdrawal from the 
                                                                                                                                       
Glut, Reuters (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-oil-cnpc-demand-
idUSKBN14W0WK (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
 37  Wang, supra note 17, at 520. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Wang, supra note 17, at 514. 
 40  Id. 
 41  See also the new U.S. administration’s position on Chinese currency manipulation. 
Joseph Adinolgi, Trump may soon label China a currency manipulator, Deutsche Bank says, 
Market Watch (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/trump-may-soon-label-
china-a-currency-manipulator-deutsche-bank-says-2017-02-07. 
 42  Wang, supra note 17, at 514. 
 43  Ali Wyne, Does China Need More Friends in Asia?, The National Interest (Mar. 20, 
2016), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-next-move-build-alliances-15550. 
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deal has extinguished the prospect of American entry.44 Ironically, the trea-
ty’s framework could allow China to step in to replace the U.S.45  
Opposition to expanded free trade in the U.S. came not solely from 
Trump, but from all across the political spectrum. The pill that citizens of 
many signatory nations found hardest to swallow was the treaty’s Article 9 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions, which would poten-
tially endanger public policy in each nation on a large scale due to the mul-
tilateral nature of the treaty and the widening of ISDS’s scope over time.46 
It did not help that Article 25.5 of the agreement set out substantial regula-
tory procedural requirements, and exceptions to both articles were nearly 
meaningless.47 
China’s western strategy embodied in the SREB plan is all the timelier 
due to U.S. leaving Afghanistan, the collapse of Russia’s economy and in-
fluence, and China’s need to hold down Xinjiang. In the best-case scenario 
for China, it and Russia could share unchallenged dominion over the region, 
but several hurdles, not the least of which is Russia’s demonstrated bad 
faith, exist that could hinder this vision.48 
Despite the relative decline of U.S. and Russian (EAEU) influence, the 
Chinese will not be able to come into the region without controversies of 
their own, and the strictly-business orientation of the SREB plan deprives 
China of the ability to exercise strategic influence.49 Mere economic ties, 
strengthened by infrastructural upgrades, would still be strategically signifi-
cant for China, as the SREB would direct international trade through the 
frontier provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet and give China a secure supply of 
oil and gas.50 Clarke also notes a particular risk with this approach: as China 
has coupled economic development efforts with thinly veiled cultural impe-
rialism, CPEC infrastructure could provide a route for extremists from 
elsewhere in Asia to infiltrate and supply separatists in its outlying provinc-
es.51 
                                                          
 44  Sarah Kimmorley, The Massive TPP Trade Deal is Dead After Obama Takes it Off the 
Table, Business Insider Australia (Nov. 14, 2016) http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/23/politics/ 
trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-withdrawal-trumps-first-executive-action-monday-
sources-say/. 
 45  See, e.g., Allen Cone, Australia’s Prime Minister Suggests China Could Replace U.S. 
in TPP, UPI (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.upi.com/top_news/world-news/2017/01/24/ 
australias-prime-minister-suggests-china-could-replace-us-in-tpp/1561485267612/. 
 46  Steven Seidenberg, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Raises Question: How Should Gov-
ernments and Corporations Resolve Disputes?”, ABA Journal (Nov. 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/trans_pacific_partnership_dispute_resolution 
(last visited February 28, 2018). 
 47  Id. 
 48  Clarke, supra note 18, at 309. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. at 302. 
 51  Id. 
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For the purpose of SREB “readiness,” Asia’s nations can be divided 
into four main, albeit loose, groups.52 The first is comprised of smaller, less 
internationally significant powers, a category into which Mongolia would 
likely fall.53 Countries that have territorial disputes against China, most no-
tably India, are the second group, with “sub-regional powers,” who com-
mand local but not large-scale influence, in the third.54 Finally, the fourth 
and most critical group, are the “pivot states” which have a history of good 
relations with China and achieve a certain threshold of national power.55 
Pakistan, which has received the most significant early benefits of SREB 
policy, is part of this last group.56 
III. PAKISTAN’S BACKGROUND AND THE CPEC 
Since its independence and separation from India in 1947, Pakistan has 
sought to counter the influence of its much larger neighbor through a com-
bination of strategic alliances and military might. Chief among the nation’s 
international benefactors have been the United States, to which Pakistan 
was an important ally in both the Cold War and the more recent campaigns 
in the Middle East, and China, which has sought to bolster Pakistan as a 
counterweight to India.57 One of the most significant cooperative efforts 
with the latter nation was the design and completion of the impressive Ka-
rakoram Highway in the 1960s over the Himalayas that separate them.58 Yet 
development in Pakistan has always faced the challenge of internal and ex-
ternal conflict. Pakistan has always given great importance to the mainte-
nance of a strong military, yet few nations that invest so heavily in military 
might can escape the armed forces’ influence on civil and international poli-
tics. Since its independence, Pakistan has experienced several periods of au-
thoritarian military rule, most recently with the government of General 
Pervez Musharraf, whose ouster in 2009 sparked remarkable political insta-
bility.59 The current civilian government under Nawaz Sharif, however, has 
                                                          
 52  Xue Li and Xu Yanzhou, How China Can Perfect its ‘Silk Road’ Strategy: The Chal-
lenges Facing China’s Silk Road Strategy and How to Overcome Them, THE DIPLOMAT 
(Apr. 9, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/how-china-can-perfect-its-silk-road-
strategy/. 
 53  Despite its large territory, Mongolia is landlocked and sparsely populated. 
 54  Li & Yanzhou, supra note 68. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Gouri supra note 7, at 40. 
 57  Donald Johnson, India-Pakistan Relations: A 50-Year History, ASIA SOCIETY, 
http://asiasociety.org/education/india-pakistan-relations-50-year-history. 
 58  Adam Hodge, Karakoram Highway: China’s Treacherous Pakistani Corridor, THE 
DIPLOMAT (July 30, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/karakoram-highway-chinas-
treacherous-pakistani-corridor/. 
 59  Jane Perlez & Salman Masood, Pakistan Ministers Are Called Before the Courts, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/world/asia/19pstan.html?rref 
=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FMusharraf%2C%20Pervez&action=click&contentCollection
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evidently held onto power well enough to encourage renewed Chinese ef-
forts at economic union.60  
The announcement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor earlier in 
this decade signals a new era for China’s relationship with Pakistan and 
may well serve as a template for future Chinese investment pacts with other 
nations in South and Central Asia. The root purpose of such a pact is the at-
tractiveness of Pakistan’s ports on the Arabian Sea (which, after all, was a 
main motivator in the Karakoram Highway’s construction).61 Indeed, one of 
the most important aspects of the plan is the expansion of the port of 
Gwadar and an overland rail connection to this port from China.62 However, 
the scope of the CPEC as planned goes much further, essentially amounting 
to an agreement to use Chinese money and loans to bind the two nations’ 
economies on terms favorable to the Chinese.63 Projects that fall under the 
plan’s framework include upgrades both to the Gwadar port and surround-
ing area; energy infrastructure; transportation infrastructure (including 
roads, railways, and improvements in Pakistani cities); “Investment and In-
dustrial Cooperation” (including through SEZ planning), and “other areas 
of interest mutually agreed upon.”64  
The CPEC agreement is paralleled by another Chinese plan to facili-
tate trade and infrastructural development with India, Bangladesh, and My-
anmar.65 Another regional power that may soon join this trade network is 
the long-closed market of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has indicated 
an interest in joining the CPEC agreement.66 In fact, development plans for 
the port of Gwadar include pipelines to transport natural gas and oil from 
Iran.67 The pending lift of international sanctions on Iran will undoubtedly 
                                                                                                                                       
=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=51
&pgtype=collection. 
 60   Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Prime Minister’s Office, pmo.gov.pk (last visited Feb. 
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affect the integrated market economy of South Asia in a manner beyond the 
scope of this article.  
The first phase of CPEC includes an “Early Harvest” round of projects 
financed at a 1.6% interest rate, and will feature an all-new road and ac-
companying railway to Gwadar to replace the somewhat dangerous Karako-
ram Highway.68 China is not the only foreign power contributing to the cor-
ridor, either; Pakistan’s erstwhile colonizer, the United Kingdom, has 
provided grants for road construction to complement the main CPEC 
spine.69 
Under the agreement, Gwadar will be a free trade area to be modeled 
on China’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs); the port itself will be leased 
(on a 43-year term) to China, and tax breaks will benefit Chinese investors 
in its construction.70 The energy projects will be completed by private com-
panies and financed by the Chinese Ex-Im Bank.71 Controversy continues to 
exist over secrecy regarding financial aspects of the deal.72 The CPEC dif-
fers from other “economic corridors” of the SREB in that it is simply a bi-
lateral deal and does not involve multi-party consultation that both the 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar and China-Russia-Mongolia corridors 
will require. With a relatively one-sided relationship between the two coun-
tries, it perhaps makes sense that secrecy and rushed planning are concerns. 
Qureshi presents a “framework” of the legal issues, beyond trade rela-
tions, that confront the CPEC. China has presented the “One Belt, One 
Road” initiative as a “new model of international cooperation and global 
governance,” which reflects the contemporary broadening of the goals of 
free trade and national development from simply an economic matter to a 
“holistic” strengthening of society.73 The CPEC agreement will have to 
meet this standard to be seen as part of China’s “new model” for trade rela-
tionships. Beyond this, it must benefit all of Pakistan to be legal by that 
country’s standards since the Pakistani constitution mandates that civil pro-
jects equitably distribute benefits.74 Qureshi notes that this would be the 
most likely basis for a legal challenge to the project from within Pakistan. 
Meanwhile, the specifics of the CPEC plan beyond stated intentions have 
been kept obscure from the public, as most of the China-Pakistan negotia-
tions are conducted through publicly unavailable Memoranda of Under-
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standing.75 What does come about may be subject to scrutiny from the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, as Pakistan’s efforts to fund the project and 
commit to China-friendly fiscal policy may implicate its extended fund ar-
rangement with that organization.76 
Qureshi asserts that the Pakistani public has a right to greater infor-
mation about the project if it would bind Pakistan’s fate to China, and that 
the lack of transparency in matters including corridor alignment to be a sig-
nificant flaw.77 (Editor’s note: since Qureshi’s article, the Chinese and Paki-
stani governments have revealed a CPEC “Master Plan.”)78 The plan may 
create a foreign-owned chunk of land across the length of the country, and 
its economic effects have already distorted competition for homegrown 
business, Qureshi acknowledges that the sheer size of China’s investment in 
Pakistan discourages rational discourse about its impacts.79  
Security is an issue of its own. Although the spine of the corridor was 
moved away from the dangerous Western borderlands of Pakistan by gov-
ernment initiative, it must still traverse Pakistan’s restive province of Balo-
chistan to reach Gwadar, a fact that has brought no small amount of risk to 
construction.80 A security issue of a different dimension lies in the fact that 
the corridor is to pass through the disputed territory of Kashmir, which is 
one of many aspects of the project, besides its inherent nature of strengthen-
ing Pakistan, that has earned objection from India.81 The aggressive posture 
of India under its nationalist Prime Minister have led some to question Chi-
na and Pakistan’s ability to secure the corridor while avoiding international 
conflict, especially as China has continued to cultivate enmity from India 
by taking Pakistan’s side at the United Nations and blocking India’s mem-
bership of the Nuclear Supplier Group.82 However, Pakistan has shown a 
strong commitment to protecting ongoing construction, and international 
tension has not stopped China from pledging the $46 billion of investments 
and loans.83 (Editor’s Note: since 2016, this number has been revised up-
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ward to $57 billion).84  
 
Pakistani Trade Law 
Pakistan’s main pieces of legislation concerning foreign investment 
are the Foreign Private Investment Act (FPIA) of 1976 and the investor-
friendly Protection of Economic Reforms Act (PERA) of 1992.85 Through 
these laws Pakistan has sought to promote an environment friendly to for-
eign investment in spite of political instability since FPIA’s adaptation.86 
The more fundamental FPIA applies to all “foreign private invest-
ment” and provides rules on calculating compensation in cases of expropri-
ation, while PERA prevents entirely the state expropriation of any privat-
ized interest.87 FPIA provides for due process, the protection of agreements 
between foreign investors or creditors and anyone in Pakistan if the gov-
ernment moves to acquire related investments in the public interest, and the 
equal national treatment of foreign, national investors for tax purposes.88 
Further, it specifies that any law or regulation more stringent to protect for-
eign investments will override FPIA, which PERA did in some cases when 
it came into force.89 However, despite the due process requirements and ju-
dicial review provisions of both laws, few investors have brought claims 
under either to Pakistani courts, likely due to persistent corruption.90 
Unlike subsequent investment and trade agreements between Pakistan 
and China, the FPIA does not separate its definitions of investor and in-
vestment. Its substitute term for “investor” is “foreign capital,” which is de-
fined as “an investment made by a foreigner in an ‘industrial undertaking’ 
in Pakistan”—whether it be in the form of foreign exchange, imported ma-
chinery/equipment, or in any other form the federal government “may ap-
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prove for the purpose.”91 
The law defines “foreign private investment” as “investment in foreign 
capital by a person who is not a citizen of Pakistan or who, being a citizen 
of Pakistan, is also the citizen of any other country or by a company incor-
porated outside Pakistan. Notably, does not include investment by a foreign 
government or agency of a foreign government,” and it clearly protects in-
vestments, not investors, making it not entirely harmonious with the bilat-
eral investment treaty (BIT)’s and FTA’s treatments of the subjects.92 
The China-Pakistan BIT and FTA do not mention “[f]ull protection 
and security” for each country’s investments in the other, which could be 
significant as several aspects of CPEC cross dangerous parts of Pakistan.93 
While this may be a minor difference, such protection is provided for in the 
Pakistan-Japan BIT, the language of which mentions an obligation to pro-
vide “constant protection and security.”94 
Companies from China, not corrupt foreign governments, control 
money under the CPEC agreement, but these companies also then have the 
ability to pay off foreign rulers, as China has no equivalent of the U.S.’s 
FCPA.95  
Gouri argues China and Pakistan need collective strategy to mend 
fences with India, contrary to other assertions that China should seek to heal 
relations with India on its own.96 He also criticizes the CPEC for not guar-
anteeing a “fair distribution of benefits,” which could leave Pakistan in the 
position of Latin American countries where strong economic growth has 
not benefited society in total, but he does not offer a way to achieve this, 
nor does he offer strategy on implementing fair labor standards in the 
SEZs.97  
Furthermore, Chinese corruption remains an elephant in the room de-
spite social responsibility provisions in the CPEC agreement.98 
IV. MONGOLIA’S ROLE AND HISTORY 
Mongolia’s history, well before the current age of global capitalism, 
has been colored by rivalry with its larger southern neighbor, China. It only 
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achieved its current political independence from China in the early part of 
the last century through becoming a satellite of Soviet Russia, and since the 
overthrow of its communist regime in 1990, the nation’s government has 
sought to diversify its economy and guarantee its people an adequate stand-
ard of living despite greatly increased poverty.99 Mongolia’s economy en-
tered a new era at the turn of this century with the opening of copper and 
gold mines in the bountiful Oyu Tolgoi, but the discovery of vast natural 
resources has forced the government to toe a fine line between encouraging 
the influx of foreign capital and attempting to distribute some of that capital 
to the nation’s people.100 Jennifer Lander has traced the back-and-forth of 
investment policy between achieving these two objectives since the 1990s, 
identifying several concrete shifts in the law whose substance will be dis-
cussed further later in this paper but which will be summarized here for the 
reader’s reference.101  
In the neoliberal spirit of the 1990s, Mongolia’s 1997 Minerals Law 
offered openness and reliability to foreign investors, including through the 
guarantee of investor-state “stability agreements” to insulate investments 
made at a given point in time from later changes in investment and tax 
law.102 While this encouraged substantial investment in the Oyu Tolgoi, the 
lingering inability of Mongolia to use foreign capital to alleviate poverty 
among its people, and concerns that the nation’s economy would fall into 
the “trap” of resource dependence, triggered changes in the law from 2006 
on that altered the status of international business there.103 A 2006 law 
sought to give the Mongolian government a stake in the operation of the 
mines, but serious issues arose from the government’s need to provide equi-
ty for this stake without going into debt.104 The collapse in the mineral mar-
ket in 2012 and fears of China stepping into the mineral business there led 
to the passage that year of the controversial, highly restrictive Strategic En-
tities Foreign Investment Law (SEFIL).105 This law attracted heavy criti-
cism before its passage and led to a collapse in international investment be-
fore being replaced in late 2013. The state has continued since 2013 to 
encourage foreign investment again while asserting political autonomy in 
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the face of China’s growing economic “soft power,” including through 
symbolic gestures to thwart China’s political principles.106 Mongolia’s situ-
ation may well be instructive for other Central and South Asian nations 
courting Chinese investment, and Mongolia did not even reach the crisis 
point that it did through selling too much to China; it had consciously at-
tempted to balance the sources of foreign investment to avoid Chinese or 
Russian domination yet still found itself at the whim of greater global mar-
ket forces. 
Corruption in the Mongolian government has also served to tarnish the 
country’s international image and attractiveness to investors, and Mongolia 
has been unable to address significantly worsening economic inequality 
since 1990.107 
Although China and Mongolia conduct a significant amount of trade, 
they do not have a free trade agreement in place; a proposed FTA in 2010 
went nowhere.108 The decline of the Mongolian economy in recent years 
has perhaps contributed to its failure to conclude more FTAs (despite suc-
ceeding in doing so with Japan), and though South Korea has notably 
opened negotiations, Mongolia has remained under Chinese economic dom-
ination.109 Mongolia’s debt load is also much greater than the size of its 
GDP, and an IMF bailout has not lessened its economic vulnerability.110 As 
of mid-2016 Mongolia’s economic dependence was as strong as ever: up-
wards of 80% of Mongolia’s export value goes to China, and a third of its 
imports come from there; by a well-regarded estimation three-quarters of 
Mongolia’s economy is dependent on China.111  
SEFIL restricted foreign entities, state-owned or private, from owning 
more than half of the stock in any company dealing in a “strategic entity,” 
and such “strategic entities” could include any economic sector that Mongo-
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lia’s government decreed.112 An exception to this rule for mineral prospect-
ing and exploration did nothing to redeem the law to investors, as it simply 
meant that companies would have to divest shares as soon as they passed 
the exploration stage of the mining process.113 The backlash among, and 
consequent withdrawal of, many foreign investors from Mongolia led a 
desperate government to impose exit bans on some, further undermining in-
vestor confidence and the country’s international standing at large, and the 
manner in which Mongolia’s government failed to issue regulations that 
might have helped investors navigate its requirements certainly did not help 
matters.114 The law was widely criticized an example of “resource national-
ism,” a larger trend of statist intervention against investor control in many 
natural resource-dependent economies.115 
Mongolia, like Pakistan, is part of the SREB vision, being enmeshed in 
a “China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor” declared by President Chi-
nese Xi Jinping in 2014.116 An agreement between the three countries in 
June 2016 formalized the plan, which already stands to gain significant 
clout due to China’s impending admission to the United Nations’ TIR (In-
ternational Road Transport) customs program for international trucking 
(TIR-licensed trucks will be able to pass through the countries with just one 
customs inspection.)117 However, the much greater territory that trade must 
traverse to reach outside markets, coupled with Mongolian ambivalence 
about Chinese influence and Russia’s economic weakness, means that stra-
tegic corridors like CPEC remain a higher priority. 
Mongolia’s 1997 Minerals Law was a major incentive to foreign in-
vestment through the use of stability agreements detailed above, but in 2006 
the national government acted to protect the “strategically important” Oyu 
Tolgoi mines by authorizing itself to have up to a 34% stake in the mines 
through individualized agreements with investors.118 The country also au-
thorized a “windfall profits” tax that it later attempted to use against a for-
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eign corporation in a possible violation of a double-taxation treaty.119 While 
some raised red flags (Williams), the country still had a stable investment 
framework and saw a significant investment boom until 2011’s drop in 
copper prices hit.120121 
Fiscal stability and integrated budget laws limited the government’s 
ability to finance its own equity stake in the Oyu Tolgoi mines following a 
2006 investment agreement, and a sudden collapse in revenue led to a large 
public debt that has dogged Mongolia ever since.122 It was in this environ-
ment that Mongolia introduced SEFIL as a stronger attempt to more equita-
bly distribute the benefits of its mining industry, but the strict provisions of 
the law combined with erratic government actions to enforce it led to a 
massive withdrawal of investments and a continuing fear of state protec-
tionism. 123  
Decline and Return of Investment? 
According to the U.S. Department of State, foreign investment in 
Mongolia peaked at the height of the country’s resource boom in 2011, and 
has fallen 85% since.124 Although the contemporary drop in mining profits 
was partly to blame, the country’s populist policy course was a much bigger 
investment disincentive.125  
Since the country’s regime change in 2014, there has been a somewhat 
more optimistic outlook, as the new government has moved to restore for-
eign investment and open new mines.126  
The country’s new Prime Minister has stated that the country’s deals 
with trading and investment partners are back on track, but it is unclear 
whether or not this rhetoric applies to non-mining investments. The rule of 
law remains weak, as Mongolia has retained authority to imprison foreign 
investors or bar them from leaving the country.127 
Although the current government supports new FDI and has promised 
to honor international arbitration judgments, it has yet to demonstrate this 
friendliness in a significant capacity, and the previous government’s use of 
exit bans and lawsuits against withdrawing investors have led to skepticism 
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of the state’s commitment to international trading norms.128 
The Investment Law (IL) of 2013 sets forth legal rights and obligations 
of investors, stabilizes the tax environment, and establishes concrete powers 
and responsibilities of the central government.129 Foreign and domestic in-
vestors are, once again, distinguished only by residence and not the stricter 
standard of nationality, and both can invest in anything that the law itself 
(as opposed to government decree) does not specifically restrict.130 
Lander is careful to state that there is not an inherently negative rela-
tion between the rule of law and investment regulation, and a recalibration 
since the neoliberal 1990s was a sensible policy, not in itself an example of 
irrational resource nationalism.131 In her view, the new Investment Law of 
2013 represents an attempt to strike a balance between the competing con-
siderations of investor confidence and broad public benefit.132 The law re-
stricts government involvement, provides national treatment to foreign in-
vestors, stabilizes tax rates, and provides new incentives for investments 
while significantly reducing government approval procedures.133 Eligible 
projects under the law, for example, can receive tax stabilization certificates 
that guarantee favorable treatment for 27 years, although their limited trans-
ferability may present problems down the road.134 Further cause for opti-
mism is seen in the stated purpose of the agency in charge of foreign in-
vestment, which is mandated to promote the value-added production so 
often missing from natural resource economies.135 
John P. Williams saw Mongolia’s post-2006 investment restrictions, 
culminating in SEFIL, as part of a resource-nationalist trend but did not see 
particular cause for alarm in its provisions.136 Together with contemporary 
Kazakh and Indonesian mining legislation, he saw a justified motivation in 
concerns over Chinese control, but his analysis of the law largely ignored 
the chaos of its implementation on the ground.137 According to Williams, 
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statist mining policy is a natural shift from the privatization frenzy of the 
1980s and 1990s, before which most mines in the developing world were 
state-owned.138 In Mongolia, Williams wrote, the 1997 investment statute, 
with its first-come, first-serve policy towards mining claims and the stabili-
zation certificate concept, was part of the 1980s-90s neoliberal legal trend 
that the 2006 adjustment abruptly curtailed.139 From 2006 on, government 
regulations as described above gave the state the power to avail itself of eq-
uity in the mines by decree.140 Like Lander, he did not see this as a reac-
tionary policy, instead noting that it was made partly as an attempt to re-
cover, through investors, substantial funds that Mongolia had paid to the 
Soviet Union for mineral exploration before 1991.141 However, the govern-
ment’s hostility to investment, manifested through erratic suspensions of 
title, culminated in the 2012 law that promulgated a wide array of govern-
ment approval requirements, including mandatory approval of acquisition 
by any foreign investors of 33% or more of any resource deemed “strate-
gic,” mandatory government approval of any acquisition or operations by 
foreign SOEs; and a parliamentary vote requirement if the value of transac-
tion for over 49% of shares of a company exceeds U.S. $76 Million.142 
The law also placed taxes on all transactions and allowed the national 
government to place local content procurement regulations applying to all 
mining companies in Mongolia.143 
Yet, contrary to almost all analytical scholarship on the issue, Wil-
liams predicted that none of the government’s investment policy would be 
harmful.144 He cited as evidence the continued successful floating of shares 
and bonds on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange by companies with mining 
properties in Mongolia, perhaps ignoring a diverse investment portfolio of 
those companies.145 Additionally, he viewed the continued planned status of 
two of the world’s largest mining projects in Mongolia and the country’s 
17% economic growth in 2010 (before the bust) as evidence of a fundamen-
tal economic soundness that was later shown to be illusory.146 Mongolia, in 
fact, at a glance appears to have done much worse in regard to foreign in-
vestment than the other Asian countries included in Williams’s analysis, for 
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which he presented gloomier outlooks.147 
The loathed SEFIL was replaced after little over a year by the 2013 In-
vestment Law, which, crucially, declared set “strategic sectors” instead of 
relying on executive decree to determine them.148 The 2013 law’s identified 
sectors are minerals, communication and finance; government approval re-
quirements for foreign state-owned enterprises (SOE) are limited to those 
investing in over 33% of an entity, and an executive agency, not Parliament, 
gives approval.149  
The law still provides regulatory oversight for foreign investment, as it 
requires that all foreign entities must be registered as “entity with foreign 
investment” (EFI) or as a “representative office” to conduct activity in 
Mongolia. These categories are distinguished by the definition of an EFI as 
a business, incorporated in Mongolia, at least 25% owned by foreign inves-
tor with a minimum contribution of $100,000, while a representative office 
can only essentially be an outpost of a foreign company that is not author-
ized to take in revenue from business activity.150 Yet a private individual 
under the new law could buy full ownership of a Mongolian company with-
out needing to receive government approval.151  
The agency created to monitor foreign investment is delegated broad 
power under the law to oversee its implementation, issue tax stabilization 
certificates to investors, make determinations about investments by foreign 
SOEs, and help investors in planning investments while protecting their in-
terests.152 (Author’s note: It is unclear whether this last purpose is at conflict 
with government or public interest.) However, in a nod to the continued 
wariness of Chinese influence and tax dodging, the agency must, if approv-
ing a foreign SOE’s investment, consider whether investment conflicts with 
national security interests, adversely impacts government revenue, or con-
strains competition.153 The agency’s viability would appear to hinge on 
whether the agency sinks to the level of corruption other Mongolian gov-
ernment bodies have.154 
The signals from Mongolia’s government have been mixed, as populist 
former wrestler Khaltmaa Battulga won the 2017 presidential election by 
running on anti-China rhetoric and resource nationalism.155 At almost the 
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same time of his election, China imposed sudden new border crossing re-
strictions to the effect of choking off Mongolian coal and copper exports 
and causing a 120-kilometer truck backup.156 Whether or not China intend-
ed this as a measure of intimidation, it certainly underscored the persistent 
anxiety in Mongolia’s politics of overdependence on China. Battulga’s de-
clared intention to foster new trade connections with Russia may too de-
pend on Chinese investment in the CRM corridor, investment for which 
China is not shy to impose conditions.157 
Mongolia’s case, for all its qualifying factors, is an instructive example 
of the hardships that can result for both sides when a nation open to foreign 
investment restricts it out of fear of outside control.  
Contrasts with Pakistan 
Foreign-owned property under CPEC (commercial or industrial) is 
safe from government acquisition, a stark contrast with Mongolia’s pre-
2014 system.158 Pakistan’s PERA already forbids the taking of privatized 
property.159 For the purposes of dispute resolution, arbitration has priority 
over judiciary methods in the China-Pakistan BIT.160 This is not the case 
with the China-Mongolia agreement, which is relevant, as the judiciary is 
inherently less reliable in an international context.161 
Objective statements can determine what gets protected under a BIT. 
The China-Mongolia BIT’s objectives are to foster the development of eco-
nomic cooperation between the countries, 162 a much less inclusive provi-
sion than that in the China-Pakistan BIT, whose purpose is “to encourage, 
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protect and create favourable conditions for investments by investors” go-
ing between states, a much more inclusive statement.163  
The China-Mongolia BIT gives separate definitions for Mongolian and 
Chinese investors. For Mongolian investors are defined as “[n]atural per-
sons who have nationality of [Mongolia]” or “[e]conomic entities incorpo-
rated or constituted in accordance with the laws of [Mongolia] provided that 
they are competent under those laws to make investment in the territory of 
the other contracting state.” Chinese investors are “[n]atural persons who 
have nationality of the people’s republic of China” or “[e]conomic entities 
established in accordance with the laws of the People’s republic of china 
and domiciled in the territory [thereof].” The China-Pakistan BIT does this 
as well, and Gouri criticizes the structure as a possible source of confusion, 
especially since the FTA makes no such distinction.164 
Differing definitions of investors between countries are a common trait 
of BITs between China-Pakistan and China-Mongolia, and could reflect a 
lesser degree of mutual understanding regarding each other’s corporate le-
gal regimes.165  
In the future, we may expect to see bilateral agreements between re-
gional nations and China to follow one of either two paths—becoming more 
uniform on Chinese terms or becoming even more specifically tailored to 
each country’s needs. Given the comprehensive nature of Chinese plans, 
one may see initial endeavors with greater carve-outs for national idiosyn-
crasies give way to structured agreements between multiple parties, but to 
discuss this possibility is to indulge in speculation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the legal regimes it must confront are varied and sometimes 
unpredictable, the evacuation of other competing powers in Asia has left 
China in a very favorable position to use its “soft power” to grow its eco-
nomic influence out over the continent. Other countries welcome Chinese 
investment, although the degree to which they are willing to accommodate 
the unavoidable accompanying expansion of influence varies. Pakistan, by 
keeping an open door to foreign investment and staying friendly with Chi-
na, is the first in line to reap the rewards of this vision, but will also be an 
example to other Asian states of what the consequences of massive Chinese 
investment are. Mongolia has not followed this route due to wariness over 
China’s current domination of its economy, yet China has shown its will-
ingness to handle different states on a case-by-case basis in FTA and eco-
nomic corridor negotiations. The example of Mongolia remains instructive 
in showing that inviting foreign investment is a one-way street to economic 
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growth which a country can start down easily and have a hard time turning 
around. An attempt to seriously restrict its use can carry drastic conse-
quences for a country’s economy. The differences between the legal pos-
tures of these states towards Chinese investments are readily visible, both in 
their own domestic law governing foreign investments and in their interna-
tional agreements with the Chinese government. Yet, as mentioned before, 
China has demonstrated a determination to overcome the differing political 
and legal postures of each country in its plan, and if it succeeds, it may well 
reap the rewards of unparalleled influence when world trade leaders negoti-
ate again. 
